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IMMUNITY OF NON-HOSPITAL CHARITIES RE-EXAMINED
Gibbon v. Y.W.CA.
170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960)
The parent-administrator of a deceased child brought a wrongful death
action claiming that the defendant's servant was negligent in allowing his
daughter to drown in a swimming pool owned and operated by the
Y.W.C.A. The Ohio Supreme Court, basing its decision on stare decisis,
sustained the defendant's demurrer, holding that a charitable or eleemosy-
nary institution, other than one which has as its purpose the maintenance
and operation of a hospital, is, as a matter of public policy, not liable for
the tortious acts of its servants.
The concept of immunity of charitable institutions for the torts of their
servants was first introduced in the United States in an 1876 Massachusetts
decision,' which was based on dicta from earlier English cases 2 The doc-
trine was soon adopted by other courts, and by 1952 there were only fifteen
states which adhered to the traditional total liability rule. Today, there are
three basic rules governing the extent to which a nongovernmental charitable
association is liable for the torts of its employees: complete immunity,
partial immunity, and total liability 3
The theories underlying the immunity concept can be placed into four
categories. (1) The trust fund theory hinges on the notion that payment
of liability claims would violate the intended use of the donations since it
would permit appropriation to "unauthorized beneficiaries." The theory
is that this is a violation of the trust agreement, and that it would
deter potential donors from contributing to charities.4 (2) Other courts
have taken the view that respondeat superior cannot be applied to a charity
because a charity usually does not derive profits from the services of its
employees, such gain being necessary, it is argued, for an employer to be
vicariously liable.5 (3) The implied waiver theory is based on the concep-
tion that a beneficiary, by accepting the benefits of the charity, implicitly
agrees to waive any tort claim that may arise against the institution.6
Although the three theories discussed above have all been said to
1 McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
2 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866); Holliday
v. St. Leonard, 11 C.B. N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861); Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross,
12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
3 See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 74-96 (1952) for a general discussion of the three
theories with a complete categorization of states; President & Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), footnotes 20-46 at 817-822.
4 Leeper v. Salvation Army, 158 Kan. 396, 147 P.2d 702 (1944); Williams v. Church
Home of Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W.2d 753 (1928); Jones v. St. Mary's Roman
Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 82 A.2d 187 (1951).
5 Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155
(1906) ; Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soe'y, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935).
6 Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1935);
Winslow v. V.F.V. Home, 328 Mich. 488, 44 N.W.2d 19 (1950).
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ultimately rest on public policy,7 there is a distinctly separate theory based
on this concept. Public policy recognizes that charitable associations operate
for the benefit of society, and therefore, in certain cases, recovery must be
denied to an individual because the interest of society requires that the
financial status of the charity be protected. Nevertheless, public policy
permits a particular court to adopt whatever rule it sees fit depending upon
the social and economic surroundings in that jurisdiction.8
Ohio allows partial immunity for charities based on public policy.9
After an early decision granting immunity to a charitable hospital for the
torts of its employees, 10 the supreme court denied immunity to a hospital
which (1) failed to use reasonable care in the selection of its negligent
servant,". or (2) where the injury was to a stranger or invitee lawfully upon
the premises. 12 The immunity rule was subsequently extended to other
charitable institutions,13 although only once did the supreme court intimate
that immunity should be given to all charities.14 Thus, before 1956, Ohio
limited the immunity doctrine to cases where a carefully chosen employee
negligently injured a benefactor of the charity. This partial immunity was
furthur eclipsed in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, where it was an-
nounced, ". . . a corporation not for profit which has as its purpose the
maintenance and operation of a hospital is, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, liable for the torts of its servants."' 51 Although the court was
careful to limit its ruling to hospitals, the rationale of the decision was
thought by many to eliminate charitable immunity in all areas. 16
7 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); See generally,
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 74 (1952).
8 For cases basing immunity on the public policy doctrine, see Cohen v. General
Hosp., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931); Gregory v. Salem Gen. Hosp., 175 Ore. 464,
153 P.2d 837 (1944); Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W.
708 (1930).
9 For Ohio cases discussing immunity in terms of public policy, see Avellone v. St.
John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956); Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio
St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938); Lakeside Hosp. v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857
(1936); Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
10 Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
11 Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., supra note 9.
12 Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
'3 Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942) (church failed to light
stairway properly and plaintiff was injured); Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., supra note 9 (ten-
year-old child was injured when defendant's employee instructed her to dive into deep
water).
14 Cullen v. Schmidt, supra note 13 at 194.
15 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., supra note 9 at 467, syllabus 1. For a good dis-
cussion of the development of Ohio's partial immunity rule, see 7 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
483 (1957). Also in 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 194 (1957) there is an excellent historical dis-
cussion and a worthwhile appraisal of the Avellone decision.
16 See justice Putnam's dissent in Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., supra note 9 at
479, "Although the instant case involves the liability of a charitable hospital, it can be
seen . . . that the same rule applies to all charitable institutions." Also see 39 B.U.L.
[Vol. 21
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Gibbon decision thus once again crystallizes Ohio's partial im-
munity position.yr The result is undesirable in that it not only leaves the
application of the immunity rule to other charitable institutions in a state
of uncertainty, but also it is a throwback to a doctrine which has no place
in the law today. While it may be true that a Y.W.C.A. substantially differs
from a hospital in size, financial worth, and services rendered, such dis-
tinctions are totally inadequate as a legal basis for the application of an
immunity doctrine. There is no sound reason today for not holding chari-
table organizations responsible for their torts. These institutions have
increased in both size and number even to the extent of competing with
private enterprise in several areas. Socio-economic factors may at one time
have dictated that charities be protected due to their limited finances;
however, the availability of liability insurance and changing public policy,
today emphasizing human values and individual needs, make this protection
outmoded and an anachronism.
The court's reliance on stare decisis is not only totally inconsistent
with its approach in other areas, but is actually an umbrella which enabled
it to ignore present-day conditions.18 The court had a perfect opportunity
to continue the progressive approach announced in Avellone. Instead, it
chose to bury Ohio deeper in the archaic rules of a bygone era. As one writer
has said,
The courts which have granted immunity to charitable organizations
appear to have usurped the legislative function of declaring public
policy and making changes in the law in accord therewith. It would
Rev. 349 (1959). The Avellone court based its decision on two grounds: changing
public policy and the availability of liability insurance.
17 It should be pointed out that after Avellone and prior to Gibbon, two Ohio
lower court opinions refused to deny immunity to churches. In Tomaselo v. Hoban &
St. Cecelia's Church, 6 Ohio Op.2d 508, 155 N.E.2d 82 (C.P. 1958) and Hunsche v.
Alter, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 68, 145 N.E.2d 368 (C.P. 1957), church organizations were held
not liable for injuries to their "guests." The Tomasello decision was affirmed by the
court of appeals, but neither it nor the Hunsche case were appealed to the supreme
court. Neither court adequately distinguished Avellone, but merely concluded churches
should be immune.
18 The court may have been influenced by the fact that the General Assembly in
1959 passed Substitute Senate Bill No. 241 which ranted all charities immunity (except
where their servants were grossly negligent) where there was injury or death to a
beneficiary. The bill was promptly vetoed by the Governor and did not get the necessary
vote to override the veto. It seems at best questionable to rely on a vetoed bill as an
expression of public policy by the legislature. Disregarding the fate of the above bill,
the court has not been reluctant to overrule their holdings in other areas where changes
were needed in order to foster "fulfillment of expectations"; see Avellone v. St. John's
Hosp., supra note 9; Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952)
(allowing the wife of a member of a voluntary unincorporated association to maintain
a tort action against the defendant-common law doctrine of legal identity of husband
and wife abolished); Williams v. Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949)
(plaintiff allowed to bring suit for prenatal injuries even though no such action was
recognized in Ohio before this time).
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be strange for these same courts to sit back and wait for the
legislature to reverse the value judgments the courts have made.19
The court in the Gibbon case chose to rest on stare decisis to an un-
justifiable extent. Stare decisis breeds uniformity and conservatism; how-
ever, it should not prevent innovations where conditions demand such
change. Adherence to precedent caused the court to overlook such factors
as the transformation to an economy emphasizing individual values as
compared to property interests, the widespread availability of liability
insurance, and the changed status of charities with reference to size and
financial position. That the immunity rule has no place in modern society
is perhaps most fully reflected in the recent trend in other jurisdictions
toward complete liability.20 These states have fully recognized that chari-
table organizations no longer need to be classified differently from the "Good
Samaritan" or private enterprise. In short, these jurisdictions have realized
that, "Charity suffereth long and is kind, but . . . it cannot be careless.
When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable wrongdoing." 21
Ronald K. Bennington
19 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1485, 1489 (1938).
20 See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 74 (1952) (Supp. 1959, at 2079); 7 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
493 (1957).
21 President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra note 3, 813.
